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Models of memory propose that separate systems underpin the storage and recollection of specific events
from our past (e.g., the first day at school), and of the generic structure of our experiences (e.g., how
lonely I am), and that interplay between these systems serves to optimize everyday cognition. Specifi-
cally, it is proposed that memories of discrete events help define the circumstances (boundary conditions)
in which our generalized knowledge applies, thereby enhancing accuracy of memory-dependent cogni-
tive processes. However, in the domain of self-judgment, cognition is systematically biased, with a robust
self-enhancement bias characterizing healthy individuals and a negativity bias characterizing the clini-
cally depressed. We hypothesized that self-enhancement effects in the mentally healthy may partly rest
on an impaired ability for specific memories to set appropriate boundary conditions on positive
self-generalizations, while the opposite may be true for self-referred negative traits in the depressed. To
assess this, we asked healthy and depressed individuals to think about the applicability of a trait to
themselves, then to recall a specific memory that was inconsistent with that trait which would therefore
index a boundary condition for its applicability. Healthy individuals showed faster recall only for specific
positive memories following negative trait evaluations, while depressed individuals demonstrated faster
recall only of specific negative memories following positive trait evaluations—the pattern expected given
the respective self-enhancement and negativity biases. Results suggest that specific memories may serve
to delimit self-generalizations in biased ways, and thus support systemic biases in trait judgments
characteristic of healthy and depressed individuals.
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Our ability to navigate the challenges of daily life critically
depends on our capacity to store and utilize memories of both
specific events from our past (e.g., where we left our keys this
morning) as well as the generic structure of our experiences (e.g.,
that we often feel lonely; McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly,
1995). It has been proposed that these distinct mnemonic functions
rely upon separable neural and cognitive systems. Tulving was
among the first to advocate a functional distinction between epi-
sodic memories, or events experienced by oneself within a sub-
jective space-time matrix, and semantic memories, or general
knowledge about the world (e.g., Tulving & Donaldson, 1972),
and variations on this broad multiple-memory-systems architecture
are now ubiquitously endorsed (see Norman, 2013). There is also
growing evidence that the brain’s hippocampal complex is in-
volved in the fast encoding of specific episodes in ways that
minimize interepisode interference, while slower neocortical sys-
tems extract overlapping information across multiple episodes in
the construction of general semantic representations of the world
(e.g., Kumaran & McClelland, 2012). Tulving (e.g., 1989, 2002)
drew a further distinction within the semantic system between
generic knowledge of the world (e.g., that cats purr) and what he
termed semantic personal memories—general facts about oneself
and one’s past (e.g., I had a mostly happy childhood).
Within autobiographical memory, the separability of neural and
functional systems underpinning the processing of such semantic
personal memories and of specific personal episodes is supported
by neuropsychological case studies (e.g., Klein & Lax, 2010;
Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988), cognitive
science (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Renoult, Davidson,
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Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012) and neuroimaging data
(e.g., D’Argembeau & Salmon, 2012; Levine et al., 2004). A
particularly fertile research landscape has been the interplay be-
tween semantic personal memories pertaining to one’s personal
traits (e.g., I am generally helpful) and specific memories of
behavioral episodes relevant to those traits, and in a series of
experimental and neuropsychological studies, Klein and Loftus
provide evidence that these two distinct forms of self-knowledge
are independently utilized and represented (e.g., Klein, Loftus, &
Sherman, 1993; see Klein et al., 2002, for a review).
One reason why personal semantic knowledge concerning one’s
traits is of particular interest is because the degree of validity of
such knowledge varies as a function of context. “Having blue
eyes” is an invariant item of personal semantic information. ‘Being
friendly,’ in contrast, even for the friendliest of people is likely to
be somewhat context-dependent, coming with subjective terms and
conditions attached (Mischel, 1969). In such cases where the
applicability of a trait judgment is not entirely consistent across
situations, the obvious processing advantages conferred by such
generic semantic representations—that they are faster to access
and utilize within decision contexts that often require split-second
decisions, is mitigated by necessary reductions in their accuracy in
any given situation. The question of how the memory system can
be organized to maximize accuracy across situations therefore
becomes pertinent (Klein et al., 2002). One potential solution
recruits the independent store of specific behavioral episodes to
mitigate the inaccuracies inherent in generic trait judgments by
providing information from the past about the particular ‘boundary
conditions’ under which such summary representations do and do
not apply (e.g., situations when I am not friendly).
This putative solution gives rise to a counterintuitive prediction,
that in decision situations where trait judgments about oneself are
required, there should not only be activation of the personal
semantic information relevant to that trait within the semantic
memory store, but also concurrent activation within the episodic
store of specific behavioral episodes that define the ‘boundary
conditions’ within which the trait judgment is valid (Klein et al.,
2002). Klein and colleagues termed this proposal the Scope Hy-
pothesis. In an elegant series of memory priming experiments
supporting this hypothesis they demonstrated that when partici-
pants were asked to reflect on the degree to which a given trait
characteristic (e.g., friendly) was true of them, they were subse-
quently quicker to recall a specific personal memory of an episode
when they had behaved in a manner that was inconsistent with that
trait (e.g., a time when they had been unfriendly). This priming of
inconsistent episodes was not present when participants were
simply asked to define the trait word—a context that does not
cause retrieval of a personal trait summary. Consistent with the
broad rationale of priming studies whereby primed target material
is rendered more accessible and/or faster to process, Klein et al.
concluded that this faster access of specific memories (in this
instance when primed by reflecting upon incongruent traits) in-
dexed a temporarily greater accessibility of those episodes within
the autobiographical memory system. This interpretation is in line
with the proposed role of those specific memories in providing
boundary conditions for the trait judgment. Interestingly, accessing
personal trait information does not appear to prime memories of
specific episodes consistent with that trait (e.g., Klein, Loftus, &
Burton, 1989; Klein, & Loftus, 1990, 1993; Klein, Loftus, Trafton,
& Fuhrman, 1992) in line with the notion that personal semantic
information and episodic information are independently stored
(see also, e.g., Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996, for supporting
neuropsychological evidence).
This key theoretical notion—that accessing semantic or generic
representations is linked to the access of representations of specific
inconsistent information—is not limited to the domain of autobi-
ographical memory. For example, in Schank’s (1980, 1982) sem-
inal work on script-based learning, the scripts derived from repe-
titions within the learning context are also proposed to contain
information pertaining to expectancy-violating experiences. Schema
models of memory make similar claims. Bartlett’s (1932) original
“schema with correction” model describes schematic representa-
tions that code regularities across experiences alongside specific
deviations from those regularities. More recently, Graesser’s
“schema pointer plus tag” model proposed generalized semantic
representations stored along with tags linking to schema-
inconsistent episodes that are retrieved whenever the schema is
activated (e.g., Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979). Similar con-
ceptualizations are outlined in the domains of social judgment
(e.g., Babey, Queller, & Klein’s, 1998, Summary-plus-Exception
Model) and category learning (e.g., the Nosofsky, Palmeri, &
McKinley, 1994, RULEX model).
A central tenet of the Scope Hypothesis (and of the family of
similar theories in other domains) is that our overall accuracy in
applying trait judgments is enhanced when the scope of more
speedily retrieved but less detailed summary memories is delim-
ited by situationally specific information that is slower to access
but more precise (Klein et al., 2002). However, if the memory
system is really organized to enhance accuracy then this raises an
important question: Why are personal trait judgments so often
systematically biased? This question is the focus of the present
study. In particular, we consider this issue with respect to the
positivity or self-enhancement bias (Brown, 1986; see Sedikides &
Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988) characteristic of healthy
participants when evaluating their own traits, and the negativity
bias evident in similar evaluations in those suffering from clinical
depression (see Beck, 2008; Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014;
Gotlib & Joorman, 2010).
One of the more robust findings within social and personality
psychology is that healthy individuals possess and express overly
positive, rather than realistic, self-perceptions (for discussion see
Taylor & Brown, 1988), judging positive traits to be far more
characteristic of the self than negative attributes (Alicke, 1985;
Brown, 1986). The unrealistic nature of these judgments is evident
from the so-called Better-than-Average-Effect, where healthy in-
dividuals tend to rate positive traits as more descriptive of them-
selves relative to others, across the board (e.g., Alicke, Klotz,
Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), and from the fact that
self-evaluations are systematically more positive than those of
independent observers (e.g., Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Bar-
ton, 1980). This self-related positivity effect extends beyond trait
judgments, encompassing attributions (see Mezulis, Abramson,
Hyde, & Hankin, 2004), and evaluations of the future (see Sharot,
2011). Of relevance here is that this overall bias also extends to the
recollection of memories of specific events. Healthy individuals
show better recall for information pertaining to personal success
than to failure (Silverman, 1964), tend to recall their own task
performance as more positive than it objectively was (Anderson,
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Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012; Crary, 1966; Gramzow, Elliot,
Asher, & McGregor, 2003), and are faster to retrieve autobio-
graphical memories of positive relative to negative events (see
Blaney, 1986; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).
A very different pattern of effects is found in sufferers of
clinical depression where unrealistic negative trait judgments are
pervasive (Greenberg & Beck, 1989; Greenberg & Alloy, 1989).
Indeed, modifying the generic representations that underpin such
judgments and other forms of negative cognition, by shedding light
on their unrealistic nature, is a central tenet of cognitive therapies
to ameliorate depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,1979). As
with the opposite pattern of positive biases in healthy participants,
negative biases are also apparent when examining patterns of
retrieval of specific behavioral episodes from memory in those
with depression. A relative difficulty in retrieving specific mem-
ories generally is a feature of the disorder (Williams et al., 2007),
with recollection of positive specific memories being particularly
affected (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014; Williams & Scott,
1988) and thus a target for selective therapeutic intervention (e.g.,
Dalgleish et al., 2013).1
How do the self-enhancement bias characteristic of healthy
individuals and the negativity bias characteristic of those with
clinical levels of depression relate to the theoretical notion that the
different memory systems involved in making personal trait deci-
sions are optimized for accuracy? One possibility is that the
implementation of the Scope Hypothesis within those systems is
itself biased—something that was not a focus of Klein et al.’s
(2001, 2002) original studies. In those terms, the coactivation or
priming of specific memories that are inconsistent with positive
trait memories in healthy individuals, and with negative trait
memories in those who are depressed, could be relatively weak. In
turn, the priming of specific memories that are inconsistent with
negative trait summaries in healthy individuals, and with positive
trait summaries in depressed people, could be relatively strong. In
Klein et al.’s (2002) terms, for the mentally healthy, specific
negative memories would impose looser boundary conditions (as
indexed by weaker priming) on the scope of positive summary trait
information, whereas for those who are depressed, positive mem-
ories would impose looser boundary conditions on the scope of
negative trait summaries, thus leading to systematic patterns of
positive and negative trait bias, respectively.
In the present study we sought to investigate these two possi-
bilities utilizing an adaptation of Klein et al.’s priming methodol-
ogy (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance., 2001) with currently
healthy and never-depressed individuals, with currently clinically
depressed individuals, and also with individuals in remission from
recurrent depression. The reasoning behind including this latter
group is that there is evidence that some of the pervasive cognitive
biases that characterize acute depression, including impoverished
specific memory access, and differential accessibility of negative
trait information, continue to operate during periods of remission
in those who experience recurrent episodes, serving as a vulnera-
bility factor for relapse (e.g., Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder,
& Fartacek, 2000; Teasdale & Dent, 1987).
Our hypotheses were that for the healthy, never-depressed in-
dividuals, activation of negative trait generalizations would prime
faster access to inconsistent specific positive memories (compared
to Klein et al.’s, 2001, word definition control condition), but that
this effect would be attenuated or absent in depressed individuals.
In contrast, we hypothesized that activation of positive trait gen-
eralizations would prime access to inconsistent negative specific
memories for depressed individuals, with an attenuation or absence
of this effect in the never-depressed sample. We had no specific
hypotheses about the direction of effects in remitted individuals as
it was unclear a priori whether the hypothesized biases would be
latent in a remitted sample (and thus only evident following some
form of mood or cognitive activation manipulation; Debeer, Raes,
Williams, & Hermans, 2011) or would be explicitly detectable (cf.,
Williams et al., 2007).
Method
Participants
The priming effect (d  1.77) originally reported by Klein et al.
(2001) for the contrast of interest was very large. A two-tailed
sample size estimation, with   .05 and power at 90%, based on
this original priming effect size indicated that a minimum of 10
participants would be required to detect within-group effects. This
would also provide sufficient power to detect any between-group
interactions as these within-group effects were predicted to act in
opposite directions to each other for the never-depressed and
depressed groups. However, we conservatively aimed to recruit at
least 50% more participants than the required number estimated by
this calculation (i.e., 15 per group), as we were focusing on the
difference in the size of this effect as a function of valence within
each group.
Participants were recruited from the clinical and nonclinical
volunteer panels at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit.
The sample comprised 27 (15 female) healthy individuals with no
lifetime history of depression, and 35 (23 female) individuals who
met criteria for a lifetime diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder
(MDD), 18 (12 female) of this latter group were currently in
remission, and 17 (11 female) were currently experiencing a Major
Depressive Episode. Depression status was determined by trained
research staff using the Structured Clinical Interview for the
DSM–IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbons, & Williams, 1996).
The sample was predominately Caucasian (95.2%) and had
completed high school (74.2%). Approximately half of the partic-
ipants were currently employed (48.4%). The mean age of partic-
ipants was 41.06 years (SD  17.00, range  18–78 years). Eight
currently depressed participants were receiving psychological
treatment and 13 were receiving antidepressant medication. No
individuals were receiving stimulant medication which may have
influenced response times.
1 It is important to note that perturbed autobiographical memory retrieval
patterns (for review see Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014) are only one of
many cognitive deficits associated with depression (e.g., attention, Peck-
ham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010; processing speed, Tsourtos, Thompson, &
Stough, 2002; for review of cognitive distortions in depression see Gotlib
& Joormann, 2010) and that depression is associated with slower response
times on a range of cognitive tasks (Azorin, Benhaïm, Hasbroucg, &
Possamaï, 1995; Miller, 1975; Rogers, Bellgrove, Chiu, Mileshkin, &
Bradshaw, J2004), particularly those requiring memory recall (e.g., Brand,
Jolles, & Gispen-de Wied, 1992).
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Autobiographical Memory Priming Task
The Autobiographical Memory Priming Task (AMPT) was
closely derived from that used by Klein et al. (2001). Each trial
comprised an initial component—processing a trait adjective that
is either positively or negatively valenced—followed by a second
component—recalling a specific memory (see Figure 1). For the
initial component, participants completed either (a) a trait self-
rating task, in which they were asked to think about how well the
presented trait adjective described them or (b) a definition task, in
which they were asked to think about the “dictionary definition”
for that trait characteristic. The definition task served as a control
condition as it required the individual to access information about
the characteristic in a manner that was not explicitly self-
referential. In the second component, participants were asked to
recall a specific autobiographical memory that either: a) involved
behavior consistent with the trait characteristic (i.e., a consistent
memory), or b) involved behavior inconsistent with the character-
istic (i.e., an inconsistent memory). The dependent variable was
the time taken for participants to recall these specific memories.
The AMPT therefore comprised eight conditions in a 2 (Initial
Component: Self-Rating, Dictionary Definition Control)  2 (Va-
lence of the Initial Component: Positive, negative)  2 (Consis-
tency of the specific memory with the initial component cue:
Consistent, inconsistent) design. Participants completed 8 trials per
condition (totaling 64 trials; see Figure 1).
For the trait characteristic stimuli we selected 32 positive and 32
negative person-descriptive words from Dumas, Johnson, and
Lynch (2002). The positivity or negativity of the characteristic was
determined by likeableness and pleasantness ratings in the Dumas
et al. corpus (see Dumas et al., 2002 for details of how ratings were
obtained). Positive cues were significantly more likable (M 
4.97, SD  0.56) than negative cues (M  2.07, SD  0.50),
t(126)  31.04, p  .001, d  5.53. Positive cues (M  755.74,
SD  59.29) were also more pleasant, (negative M  223.42,
SD  63.63), t(78)  38.73, p  .001, d  8.77. To determine
antonyms for each of these characteristics, we searched the char-
acteristic in Roget’s Thesaurus (Davidson, 2006), and selected an
antonym listed for the characteristic that was also included in the
Dumas et al. (2002) wordlist to allow us to use the Dumas et al.
ratings. The experimental stimuli were comparable between con-
ditions, with no significant interactions between valence (i.e.,
positive or negative) and the task-component the word was used
for (i.e., as a cue for the initial component or as a specific memory
cue) in predicting Kuèera-Francis word frequency, F(1, 124) 
2.55, p .11, p2  .02, meaningfulness, F(1, 88) 0.59, p .45,
p2  .01, and familiarity, F(1, 124)  0.03, p  .88, p2  .01,
according to the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988).
Cue words were randomly assigned to experimental condition
between participants.
The AMPT was presented on a computer and programmed using
E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 2012). Prior to
beginning the test trials, on-screen instructions were presented
for the initial component stating that participants would need to
either think about how much the personality characteristic de-
scribed them or to think about the dictionary definition for the
word. For the second component, participants were instructed that
they would need to recall a specific incident: “an event that





























Posive trait self-rang 
e.g., Think about how well 
friendly describes you 
 
Posive trait deﬁnion 
e.g., Think of the diconary 
deﬁnion of brave 
 
Negave trait self-rang 
e.g., Think about how well 
boring describes you 
 
Negave trait deﬁnion 
e.g., Think of the diconary 
deﬁnion of defeated 
 
Consistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in an friendly manner 
Consistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in a brave manner 
 
Consistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in a boring manner 
 
Consistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in a defeated manner 
 
Inconsistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in an unfriendly manner 
 
Inconsistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in an interesng manner 
 
Inconsistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in a cowardly manner 
 
Inconsistent trial (n = 8) 
e.g., Recall a speciﬁc incident in which you behaved in a victorious manner 
 
Inial Component Speciﬁc Memory Component   
Figure 1. Design of the Autobiographical Memory Priming Task.
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and an example was provided. Participants were informed that it
was important that they immediately indicate when they had
completed each component by pressing any computer key.
For each test trial, a short reminder of the task instructions and
the relevant cue were simultaneously presented and remained on
the screen until participants selected a key to show that they had
completed that component. The time interval between screen pre-
sentation and pressing the key was recorded. The time it took for
participants to press a key to indicate recall of a specific memory
on the second component of the task was our dependent variable.
Following completion of the initial component, a blank screen
appeared for 1 second, and then the specific memory instructions
and cue were presented. To remind participants of task instructions
for the second component, after indicating that they had brought a
memory to mind, a screen asked, “Was your memory of one
particular time/one particular event?” If the participant indicated
that it was not a specific incident, they were reminded that they
needed to recall a specific incident. The reason for this was that
with consistent prompting, depressed individuals are able to over-
come their natural difficulty in accessing specific memories (Dal-
gleish et al., 2007). There was no significant difference in the
proportions of initial declared nonspecific responses between the
healthy (M  .04, SD  .06), depressed (M  .11, SD  .20), and
remitted (M  .13, SD  .20) groups, F (2, 54)  1.95, p  .152,
p2  .07. After a 2-second intertrial interval the next trial was
presented.
Prior to the 64 test trials, participants completed eight practice
trials (one for each experimental condition) during which they
were required to report their memories aloud to ensure that task
instructions were understood. After completing the AMPT, partic-
ipants were presented with each cue used in the experiment, and
asked to rate the cue on a 9 point scale from 1  ‘extremely unlike
me’ to 9 ‘extremely like me’. These ratings allowed us to consider
the effect of cue self-relevance on our experimental findings.
Procedure
Ethics approval was obtained from the East of England com-
mittee of the NHS National Research Ethics Service. All partici-
pants provided informed consent. Participants were informed that
they would be completing a number of tasks involving the pro-
cessing of personal trait adjectives. Participants first completed the
experimental task, followed by a short break and then they com-
pleted the cue word ratings. Participants next completed the Beck
Depression Inventory- Second Edition (BDI-II), a gold-standard
self-report measure of depression symptoms (Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1996). To allow us to assess whether verbal ability and
fluency affected performance on the experimental tasks, partici-
pants also completed the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale—Synonyms
Test Form B (Raven & John Hugh Court, 1998), a measure of
acquired verbal knowledge in which participants are required to
select a synonym for 34 English words, and the Verbal Fluency
Task, which required participants to retrieve as many words as
possible in one minute that matched the given category (words
begining with the letter A and types of animals; Tombaugh, Kozak,
& Rees, 1999). Participants received an honorarium of £12 for
their time.
Results
The latencies to retrieve specific memories were transformed
using a square root transformation (see supplemental materials for
details) to remove the positive skew common to response time data
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2014; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Trans-
formed data were therefore used in all analyses. Data were ex-
cluded from three participants in the never-depressed group, one in
the remitted and one in the depressed group, due to noncompliance
with the experimental protocol (see supplementary materials for
details). The analyzed dataset therefore comprised 24 participants
in the never-depressed group, 17 in the remitted group, and 16 in
the depressed group.
Sample Characteristics
As anticipated, the depressed group had higher BDI-II scores
(descriptive statistics in Table 1) than the remitted, p  .001, d 
0.58, and never-depressed, p .001, d 2.91, groups, F (2, 54)
38.74, p  .001, p2  .64. As further anticipated, the remitted
group also demonstrated significantly more symptoms on the
BDI-II than never-depressed participants, p  .009, d  1.25. The
mean BDI-II score indicated a ‘moderate’ level of symptom se-
verity for the depressed group and a ‘minimal’ level of symptom
severity for the never-depressed and remitted groups (Beck et al.,
1996). In terms of the number of previously experienced depres-
sive episodes, 12 of the currently depressed participants had ex-
perienced too many depressive episodes to count the number of
distinct episodes (this represents one of the coding categories on
the SCID; First et al., 1996). This was also the case for three of the
Table 1
Mean (Standard Deviation) Sample Characteristics by Group
Variable Never-Depressed (n  24) Remitted (n  17) Depressed (n  16)
Age in years 28.63 (11.01) 52.11 (14.75) 49.12 (14.34)
Number of females 14 12 11
Education 7:9:6:2 5:5:5:2 5:3:4:4
Number currently employed 9 9 9
Mill Hill Vocabulary Test 20.14 (4.52) 23.44 (5.02) 22.18 (5.39)
Verbal Fluency 42.58 (11.49) 39.50 (10.61) 37.29 (8.80)
BDI-II 3.71 (4.22) 12.13 (9.33) 27.18 (11.51)
Note. BDI-II  Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition; Education  number of participants to have
completed high school: undergraduate degree: postgraduate degree: diploma or professional training.
 All groups differed from one another at p  .001.
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remitted individuals. For those remitted participants able to iden-
tify the number of previous episodes, the mean number of episodes
was 4.40 (SD  3.11), consistent with the experience of recurrent
depression. Age did differ between the never-depressed and remit-
ted, p  .001, and depressed conditions, p  .001, F (2, 59) 
21.72, p  .001. Although age was not associated with perfor-
mance on any of the outcome measures, rs (n 62).10, ps
.423, we repeated our key between-groups analyses with age
included as a covariate and the results were unchanged (and in fact
the effects were stronger). All groups were comparable in terms of
scores on the Mill Hill Vocabulary test, F (2, 54) 1.88, p .163,
p2  .05, and the Verbal Fluency Task F (2, 54) 1.30, p .280,
p2  .07.
Hypothesis Testing
Figure 2 presents the response times (square root transformed)
for recall of an inconsistent specific memory across the different
groups and task components. Complete response time data for
recall of a specific memory across all of the different AMPT
conditions is presented, by group, in supplementary Table 1. If the
speed of access to a specific memory is an index of its capacity to
delimit the scope of a preceding trait self-rating for which the
memory is inconsistent, then we would expect response time on
inconsistent memory trials to be shorter when the initial compo-
nent involved a trait generalization self-rating (relative to the
dictionary definition comparison condition) - the priming effect
(Klein et al., 2001). As outlined in the Introduction, we had two
key hypotheses. We expected that for the healthy, never-depressed
group, this priming effect would be greater following negative trait
self-ratings than for positive trait self-ratings. For the depressed
group, we expected the opposite with the priming effect being
greater following positive trait-self-ratings than following negative
trait self-ratings. We had no a priori prediction for the remitted
group.
We initially conducted an omnibus 3 (Group: Never-depressed,
remitted, depressed)  2 (Valence of the trait self-rating: Positive,
negative)  2 (Initial component: Self-rating, dictionary defini-
tion)  2 (Consistency of the specific memory: Inconsistent,
consistent) mixed-model ANOVA with time taken to recall a
specific memory (square root transformed) as the dependent vari-
able. We observed main effects of task, F (1, 54) 4.17, p .046,
p2  .07, and consistency, F (1, 54)  3.97, p  .051, p2  .07,
and an interaction between task and consistency, F (1, 54)  5.29,
p  .025, p2  .09, all qualified by a significant four-way
interaction, F (2, 54)  5.38, p  .007, p2  .17, consistent with
our specific predictions.2 None of the other main effects or inter-
actions reached significance Fs  2.61, ps  .083.
We examined this four-way interaction between each pairing of
the three groups. Performance on the AMPT was significantly
different between never-depressed and depressed conditions, F (1,
39) 9.74, p .003, p2 .20, as expected. However the remitted
group did not differ from either the never-depressed, F (1, 40) 
1.34, p  .253, p2  .03, or the depressed groups, F (1, 32) 
3.76, p  .061, p2  .11.
Having established that there was a significant differential effect
across the depressed and never-depressed groups, we next exam-
ined each of these two groups separately to explore our specific
hypotheses. For the never-depressed group, there was a significant
3-way interaction of Valence  Task  Consistency, F (1, 23) 
5.32, p  .031, p2  .19, consistent with the differential pattern of
task performance across positive and negative trials that we pre-
dicted (see Figure 2). Breaking this effect down by valence, a
Significant Task  Consistency interaction was observed for neg-
ative trials, F (1, 23) 4.45, p .046, p2 .13. In line with faster
access to inconsistent specific memories delimiting the scope of
the prior negative self-rated trait, response time on inconsistent
trials was significantly shorter following a negative trait self-
rating, relative to a definition of a negative trait, t (23)  2.13,
p  .044, d  0.24 (see Figure 2). This difference was not
evident on consistent trials, t (23)  0.15, p  .882, d  0.02.
The Task  Consistency interaction was nonsignificant for
positive trials, F  1.
For the depressed group there was a near significant 3-way
interaction of Valence  Task  Consistency, F (1, 15)  4.28,
p  .056, p2  .22. Deconstructing this by valence, we found a
Significant Task Consistency interaction for positive trials, F (1,
15)  6.57, p  .022, p2  .31, but not for negative trials, F  1.
As predicted, response time on inconsistent trials was significantly
shorter when following a self-rating of a positive trait than when
following a dictionary definition of the trait, t (15)  4.37, p 
.001, d 0.35. Again, this effect was not significant for consistent
trials, t (15)  1.69, p  .112, d  0.15.
Although the pattern of performance in the remitted group was
not significantly different to that of either of our other groups, we
nevertheless examined the profile of task performance within this
group. However, unlike the depressed and never-depressed groups,
we found no support for a 3-way interaction of Valence  Task 
Consistency, F  1.
Discussion
Klein and colleagues’ Scope Hypothesis (Klein et al., 2001,
Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002) argues that when we
retrieve personal semantic information (Tulving, 2002) that has
context-dependent veridicality, memories of specific autobio-
graphical episodes that represent exceptions to that information are
primed such that the boundary conditions or ‘scope’ for when the
semantic information is true, versus when it is invalid, can be
delimited. For instance, a self-referent trait judgment such as “Am
I friendly?” would involve retrieval of generic personal semantic
information about my overall degree of friendliness, paralleled by
priming of memories of specific episodes when my level of friend-
liness had deviated significantly from this personal norm. The
theoretical rationale is that any increases in speed of cognizing that
are leveraged by the rapid retrieval of generic self-referent trait
information would be offset by limitations in the appropriateness
of that information in any given situation. However, accuracy can
be preserved when the boundary conditions on the validity of the
generic trait information—it’s scope—are set in place by primed
episodic memories of exceptions. These specific memories are
slower to retrieve, thus creating an overall speed–accuracy trade-
off (Klein et al., 2002).
The question we wanted to examine was why, if the system is
thus optimized for accuracy, are self-relevant trait judgments rou-
2 This interaction remained significant when age was included as a
covariate in the analysis, F(2, 53)  6.32, p  .003, p2  .19.
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tinely biased? This is the case not only in those with mental health
problems, such as depression (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014),
who are characterized by biased and maladaptive views of the self,
but also in healthy individuals who are characterized by biased
overly positive self-views (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
We hypothesized that such biases in trait judgments may in part
result from asymmetries in the aforementioned episodic memory
priming effects, such that for those experiencing depression, there
would be greater priming of negative episodic memories that were
thus inconsistent with positive self-referent traits, than vice versa.
We predicted the opposite pattern in healthy participants. We also
examined performance in individuals with a history of depression
who were in remission, but for whom we had no a priori predic-
tions.
Our results using the memory priming paradigm established by
Klein (Klein et al., 2001, 2002) provided support for both hypoth-
eses. In individuals with depression, recollection of countertrait
specific negative memories was relatively faster following their
evaluation of a positive trait (relative to the definition control
condition), compared to the other way around. This contrasted
with never-depressed controls who exhibited relatively faster rec-
ollection of positive countertrait memories following evaluation of
a negative self-referent trait, compared to the other way around.
Individuals remitted from depression did not appear to exhibit a
significant priming effect following evaluation of either positive or
negative self-traits, suggesting an attenuation of the bias evident in
those currently experiencing a depressive episode, but also a
potential lack of reinstatement of the bias associated with stable
mental health.
The present findings, as discussed in the Introduction, suggest
that the relatively reduced accessibility of specific negative infor-
mation necessary to set realistic constraints on the “scope” (Klein
et al., 2002) of positive self-generalizations may be one potential
process supporting the ubiquitous positive self-biases associated
with mental health (Taylor & Armor, 1996; Taylor & Brown,
1988). In contrast, relatively “unbounded” (Klein et al., 2002)
negative self-generalizations in depression may be one process that
fosters, maintains, and amplifies globalized negative self-referent
thinking patterns (including overgeneralization, catastrophization,
negative self-attributions, disqualification of positive information),
as well as perpetuating rumination (Rimes & Watkins, 2005) -
factors that are known to exacerbate depression severity and per-
sistence and that have been shown to permeate daily cognition in
depression sufferers (Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979). Interventions
designed to ameliorate disturbance in the accessibility of autobi-
ographical memories (e.g., by improving accessibility of specific
memories of positive events; cf. memory specificity training; Raes,
Williams, & Hermans, 2009) may thereby help to shift the over-
generalized negative thoughts and beliefs that are characteristic of
depression. These interventions have shown considerable promise
in alleviating depressive symptoms (for review see Hitchcock,
Werner-Seidler, Blackwell, & Dalgleish. 2017) and the current
results suggest that these interventions may work in part through
reinstating memory retrieval patterns that help to set ‘boundaries’
on negative self-beliefs. Further exploration of this potential mech-
anism may help to elucidate whether interventions translated from
basic science offer a low-intensity option for shifting maladaptive
cognitions targeted in more complex therapies (e.g., cognitive
therapy).
Although our results are consistent with the theoretical notions
advanced by Klein et al. (2002), it is important to note that priming
of countertrait specific memories following a trait judgment does
not itself directly demonstrate that those trait generalizations have
been bounded by the retrieved specific event memories. At the
very least, one would want to show that trait judgments system-
atically differ when putative relevant boundaries are in place
relative to when they are not. However, to demonstrate this a
methodology that permits the manipulation of these mnemonic
boundaries would be required, and it is not immediately clear what
such a methodology would look like. It is also unclear whether the
specific memories actually need to be explicitly retrieved as epi-
sodic recollections in order to exert any delimiting effects, or
whether their primed activation is sufficient to appropriately tem-
per the self-referent trait judgment at hand.
An interesting question is how the present findings fit with

























Figure 2. Mean (square root transformed) number of milliseconds to recall an inconsistent specific memory by
valence of the trait and type of initial component for each group. Untransfomed data are presented in the
supplementary materials. Note.  p  .05. Error bars are standard error of the mean.
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plified by the framework of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000).
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s model (see also Williams et al.,
2007 for an application to depression) proposes a hierarchically
organized system comprising levels of representations correspond-
ing to varieties of personal semantic information and event specific
knowledge. No explicit provision is made for the sorts of priming
relationships outlined by Klein et al. (2002) and supported by the
present data. However, one could posit some form of tag or pointer
to inconsistent event specific knowledge, contained within per-
sonal semantic memories, would provide the requisite functional-
ity. This would concord with solutions to this issue proposed by
theories with family resemblance to Klein et al.’s model (e.g.,
Babey et al., 1998; Graesser et al., 1979; Nosofsky et al., 1994;
Schank, 1980, 1982).
Although the present study focuses on self-referred trait judg-
ments, it seems plausible that such asymmetrical priming effects,
as a potential index of systematic biases in how semantic infor-
mation is applied in the world, would have relevance in other
domains of cognition. Most local to the present study would be
personal semantic information other than trait judgments; for ex-
ample, the sorts of evaluations of the past or future that are also
problematic in depression and subject to the same positive biases
in the mentally healthy (e.g., Sharot, 2011). Trait judgments of
others would also provide a fertile ground for investigating puta-
tive priming asymmetries (e.g., Babey et al., 1998). Klein and
colleagues have demonstrated similar priming effects with respect
to judgments about close others (Klein et al., 2001) and the
relevance of this approach to understanding the utilization of
stereotypes versus individuating information about others, and the
cognitive substrates of prejudice, are intriguing (Stangor & Cran-
dall, 2013).
In summary, the present results provide support for the notion
that asymmetrical priming effects in memory may in part underpin
both positive self-reference biases in the mentally healthy and
negative self-referent biases in those with depression. They have
implications for extant theories of autobiographical memory (e.g.,
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and potentially for novel
memory-training based interventions to alleviate depression (Dal-
gleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014; Hitchcock et al., 2017).
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